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THE DEVIL’S ADVOCATE: USING 
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS? 
Adam B. Shniderman* 
INTRODUCTION 
Why does one death matter against so many? Because 
there is good and there is evil, and evil must be pun-
ished. Even in the face of Armageddon I shall not com-
promise in this. But there are so many deserving of retri-
bution . . . and there is so little time. 
Walter Kovacs/Rorschach, WATCHMEN 
ank Greely writes, “[t]oday we are regularly making new 
discoveries about the functioning of the human brain, 
discoveries that have led many lawyers, philosophers, and neu-
roscientists to speculate about the consequences of our new un-
derstanding for the criminal justice system.”1 Greely notes that 
scholars have focused almost exclusively on questions of re-
sponsibility, reaching conclusions “from apocalyptic to ‘business 
as usual.’”2 Joshua Greene, a philosopher at Harvard Universi-
ty, leans towards the apocalyptic view. Greene asserts that our 
operative “legal principles exist because they more or less ade-
quately capture an intuitive sense(s) of justice.”3 For him, neu-
roscience will challenge and “reshape our intuitive sense of jus-
tice.”4 While he concedes that the “business as usual” scholars, 
namely Stephen Morse, are correct that the law currently re-
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 1. Henry T. Greely, Neuroscience and Criminal Justice: Not Responsibil-
ity But Treatment, 56 U. KAN. L REV. 1103, 1103 (2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes 
Nothing and Everything, 359  PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. LOND. B 1775, 1775 (2004). 
 4. Id. 
H
656 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
quires only minimal rationality, Greene contends that new 
neuroscientific discoveries will radically change society’s intui-
tive sense of justice, our collective morality.5 The issues facing 
the American criminal justice system are complicated. But 
what does the emergence of this science mean for the trials of 
the most horrific crimes? 
Since the first modern war crimes trial at Nuremberg, there 
has been speculation that war criminals’ deviant and aberrant 
behavior stemmed from psychopathology.6 In response to Adolf 
Eichmann’s seemingly ordinary demeanor during his trial in 
Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt famously characterized his behav-
ior as “the banality of evil,” although some disagree with her 
assessment.7 Gustave Gilbert, an American Army psychologist 
assigned to interview and evaluate the defendants at Nurem-
berg, characterized the defendants as uniformly lacking empa-
thy, potentially qualifying these defendants as psychopaths.8 
Miale and Selzer also found what they believe supported a 
claim of pervasive psychopathology among the Nuremberg de-
fendants.9 They concluded, “[t]he Nazis were not psychological-
ly normal or healthy individuals.”10 Instead, these men consti-
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 1775–76, 1784; see also Stephen J. Morse, Determinism and the 
Death of Folk Psychology: Two Challenges to Responsibility from Neurosci-
ence, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH 1, 2 (2008); Greely, supra note 1, at 1103. 
 6. JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT 
GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLING 59–62 (2007). Gustave Gilbert, an army psy-
chologist at Nuremberg, wrote several articles developing what he thought 
was the explanation for the behavior of high-ranking Nazi officials. In 1963, 
Gilbert published The Mentality of SS Murderous Robots, in which he main-
tained that the Nazis had cultivated a particular personality type that lacked 
any sense of empathy or conscience. Others, however, have disagreed. See id. 
at 63–70. 
 7. HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM (2006). Most notably, Raul 
Hilberg disagreed with her assessment of Eichmann’s evil as “banal” in his 
work THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS. 
 8. The term psychopath is frequently used to describe violent offenders 
and people whose motives the public does not understand. In this paper, the 
term psychopath is used strictly in a psychological, technical sense, referring 
to those individuals who score 30 or greater on the Hare Psychopathy Check-
list Revised (PCL-R). Hare Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), available 
at http://www.minddisorders.com/Flu-Inv/Hare-Psychopathy-Checklist.html; 
ROBERT HARE, MANUAL FOR THE HARE PSYCHOPATHY CHECKLIST-REVISED 
(1991). 
 9. WALLER, supra note 6, at 67. 
 10. ERIC ZILLMER, THE QUEST FOR THE NAZI PERSONALITY: A PSYCHOLOGICAL 
INVESTIGATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS 94 (1995). 
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tuted, from a psychological standpoint, a “highly distinctive 
group.”11 The possibility that a war criminal would offer insani-
ty or diminished capacity as a defense is not new. Some were 
concerned that three defendants at Nuremberg, most notably 
Rudolph Hess, would attempt to plead insanity.12 More recent-
ly, Esad Landzo offered an affirmative, psychological defense at 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
during the “Celebici Camp” trial.13 With the increased use of 
neuroscience in courtrooms across the world, supporting claims 
that there are biological underpinnings to these psychological 
phenomena, comes the possibility that defendants tried at the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) will attempt to mitigate 
their culpability or excuse their conduct with support from 
brain scans and expert witnesses. 
To the extent modern War Crimes trials seek to model them-
selves after domestic criminal proceedings (i.e., holding an in-
dividual responsible for his or her actions through adjudication 
of guilt followed by punitive sanctions), the use of evidence 
demonstrating neurologic pathologies associated with deviant 
behavior may hinder the court’s ability to find offenders culpa-
ble. In fact, several key aspects of the international criminal 
justice system face challenges from this emerging science. 
What do neuroscientific discoveries about deviance, particular-
ly violence, mean for the didactic value of trials, for justice, and 
the form of response we choose to implement in the wake of 
                                                                                                             
 11. Id. at 177–78. 
 12. Prior to trial, doctors from each delegation, the United States, the 
United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and France, evaluated Hess’ mental con-
dition. They concluded that Hess was not insane in the strict sense of the 
word– he was aware of what was going on around him. However, they did 
suggest that he could be impaired in his ability to assist in his own defense. 
Given the evaluations, Hess proceeded to trial without offering an insanity 
defense. See Report of Commission to Examine Defendant Hess (Nov. 17, 
1945), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/v1-28.asp. 
 13. Esad Landzo was purported to be a guard at the detention facility in 
Celebici, Bosnia between May and December 1992. He was indicted and de-
tained at the ICTY in 1996. Landzo was charged with 24 counts of criminal 
conduct, including multiple counts of murder, torture, and rape. Landzo’s 
mental state was a significant issue at trial. Several psychiatrists evaluated 
the defendant and testified about his mental state. The court ultimately re-
jected his claim that he was not responsible for his actions due to psychologi-
cal disorders. Landzo was convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in prison 
and was released in 2006. See infra notes 137–141 and accompanying text for 
further discussion. 
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atrocity? Certainly, the ICC and other international criminal 
tribunals could look to the domestic courts of various nations 
for guidance on how to address these questions. Ultimately, the 
substantial differences between ordinary domestic trials and 
extraordinary perpetrator trials suggests that the path taken 
in various domestic contexts to incorporating neuroscience and 
addressing the particular challenges and issues it poses, is like-
ly to provide little guidance for international criminal tribu-
nals. 
This Article explores the difficult questions and choices the 
ICC and other international criminal tribunals will face from 
evolving scientific discoveries. First, this Article traces the de-
velopment of international criminal law, and its adjudication 
through various international criminal courts. Second, it con-
siders the specific scientific developments relevant to the issue 
of adjudicating culpability. Third, the Article discusses the im-
plications for international criminal trials of having to address 
a neuroscience-based understanding of culpability, specifically 
discussing the implications for the due process rights of the ac-
cused, the rights and needs of the victims, the didactic value of 
trials, and the viability of the trial model in light of evolving 
issues at the intersection of law, politics, and neuroscience. 
This analysis will show that whether the international criminal 
legal regime accepts or rejects this science, the legitimacy and 
justness in a traditional trial model is zero-sum. That is, the 
rights of either the accused or victim will be undermined; we 
must decide whose. Yet, this realization does not prove fatal for 
trials before the ICC. Finally, this Article makes suggestions 
for future research and also considers alternative justifications 
for punishing offenders at international criminal trials so as to 
allow the continuation of a tradition of holding individuals, 
particularly heads of state, accountable for their conduct. 
I. PRELUDE TO THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIAL 
The concept that certain conduct is unacceptable or unlawful 
even in times of war can be traced as far back as the sixth cen-
tury BCE.14 Chinese military general and philosopher Sun Tzu 
wrote that punitive and excessive measures against an enemy 
                                                                                                             
 14. SUN TZU, ART OF WAR (Stephen F. Kaufman ed., Stephen F. Kaufman 
trans., 1996). 
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were inexcusable.15 He argued that these measures were unac-
ceptable because they were ineffective and inefficient. Sun 
Tzu’s writings shaped the law of war and international law go-
ing forward.16 There are a few historical examples of holding 
individuals accountable for violating the laws of war long be-
fore anyone even contemplated the trials at Nuremberg. 17 
However, these incidents did not take place in a nominal court 
of law and they were not true trials, so much as occasions for 
pronouncing unilateral, predetermined findings of guilt and 
summary execution.18 Each of these “trials” occurred in a time 
in which Cicero’s pronouncement that “law is silent amidst the 
clash of arms,” reigned.19 
The precedent for holding recognized heads of state individu-
ally responsible in a court of law traces back to the trial of King 
Charles I in 1649. This trial marked the first prosecution of a 
civilian or military head of state in a court of law for crimes 
committed during conflict.20 At the time, holding a recognized 
head of state responsible for conduct during wartime was a 
                                                                                                             
 15. Timothy L.H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes 
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 684  
n.4 (1997). 
 16. Id. at 684. 
 17. See Jordan J. Paust, ILSA Panel Oct. 18, 2003, at Loyola University 
New Orleans-Panel on History of International Tribunals Prior to Nurem-
berg: Selective History of International Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nu-
remberg, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 207, 207–8 (2003). For a discussion of 
individuals tried before tribunals convened prior to Nuremberg, see M. 
CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND 
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 86–156 (2011). 
 18. For example, the English tried and executed William Wallace for trea-
son and atrocities against civilians in 1305 CE. The ad hoc trial afforded Wal-
lace no legal rights or privileges. They marched Wallace through the city to 
the place of his eventual execution, the indictment was read and sentence 
was pronounced and carried out without any opportunity for defense. 
MAGNÚS MAGNÚSSON, SCOTLAND: THE STORY OF A NATION 155 (2000). 
 19. While this is an oversimplification—in that, as noted, there had been 
an understanding that there were rules governing the conduct of war long 
before any of these trials—I wish to convey that at the time of these trials, it 
was not a routine practice to hold perpetrators responsible for conduct during 
wartime. Political pressures and pragmatism greatly overshadowed any ex-
pectation of individual accountability. 
 20. CHARLES ANTHONY SMITH, THE RISE AND FALL OF WAR CRIMES TRIALS: 
FROM CHARLES I TO BUSH II 29 (2012). 
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novel concept.21 The trial arose following the conclusion of the 
English Civil War for the supposed purpose of redressing the 
wrongs committed by Charles I against both civilians and the 
prevailing military.22 Charles I was charged with murdering 
civilians, torture, involuntary conscription, and high treason.23 
However, the substantive and procedural flaws of this “trial” 
demonstrate it was little more than a farce, constituted to serve 
the political agenda of the prevailing army, led by Oliver 
Cromwell.24 Substantively, the tribunal was created and con-
vened to try a single individual from the entire conflict and the 
substance of the indictment was stretched to assure that the 
charges would stand against Charles I.25 The procedural as-
pects were little better. Charles I had no right to appeal, par-
don, or reconsideration26 and he faced his accusers without a 
number of additional procedural rights: the right to counsel, 
the ability to present a defense or challenge the prosecution’s 
evidence, the right to cross-examine any witnesses, and the 
ability to appeal any judicial decision.27 Charles I steadfastly 
protested his trial, asserting that because of the significant le-
gal shortcomings the court lacked the legitimacy to try him.28 
However, to acknowledge any of the king’s assertions would 
mean the court lacked the legal right to proceed. As such, the 
court summarily dismissed and disregarded his claims. Be-
cause Charles I refused to cooperate with the orchestrators of 
                                                                                                             
 21. Id. at 103. Smith suggests that prior to Nuremberg, holding an indi-
vidual responsible for his or her conduct during war was a novel concept. 
 22. Id. at 36. 
 23. Id. 
 24. “The appeal to the rule of law as a justification for their actions was a 
mechanism used by Cromwell and his faction simply to facilitate the imple-
mentation of the style of government that they desired.” Id. at 35. Conducting 
a trial to convict Charles I prior to executing him, instead of summarily exe-
cuting him without even the façade of legal process as had happened in the 
past to tyrants, would not convey the same message. The trial signified a 
shift in the style of governance, in which those who made the laws would be 
bound by them, rather than above the law as had been the case with the 
monarchy. As Smith writes, “[t]he premise of how this approach would help 
consolidate power was straightforward. Specifically, if even the monarch was 
subject to the dictates of the law, then the law would be supreme over every-
one.” Id. 
 25. Id. at 39. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 43. 
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the trial and embrace an apparently predetermined fate, the 
court treated the king’s non-response as an admission of guilt 
and convicted him of the crimes charged in the indictment.29 
While civilian and military leaders were held responsible in 
various formal trials following the trial of Charles I, the con-
cept that heads of state and military leaders should be tried in 
criminal courts for crimes committed at their behest did not 
become widely accepted or routine until the twentieth centu-
ry.30 Prior to Nuremberg, the idea that individual perpetrators 
would and could be held accountable for their conduct was 
quite radical.31 The combination between the increasing fre-
quency of states punishing violations of the laws of war and the 
agreements reached at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 
and 1907 for the first multilateral conventions regulating the 
conduct of war resulted in a growing recognition and ac-
ceptance of individual culpability for violations of the interna-
tional laws of war.32 
II. THE MODERN TRIAL PARADIGM 
The turn of the twentieth century marked the beginning of a 
concerted effort to design a framework for holding leaders indi-
vidually responsible for acts occurring during war. From the 
outset of World War I, Allied states called for the trial of Cen-
tral Power individuals engaged in perpetrating atrocities.33 The 
Allied governments established a Commission on the Responsi-
bility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penal-
ties, charged with investigating who was responsible for 
breaches of the laws of war, and with drafting proposals for the 
establishment of a “High Tribunal” to try these offenders.34 De-
spite the participants’ strong sentiment for holding perpetra-
tors accountable and the dedication and careful work that went 
                                                                                                             
 29. Id. at 44. 
 30. Lawrence Douglas, The Didactic Trial: Filtering History and Memory 
into the Courtroom, 14 EURO. REV. 513, 513 (2006). 
 31. Id. 
 32. TIMOTHY L.H. MCCORMACK & GERRY J. SIMPSON, THE LAW OF WAR 
CRIMES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 43 (1997). These initial 
and subsequent agreements developed at The Hague created a unified, inter-
national set of “laws of war” for States to follow. Prior to these agreements, 
the laws of war varied from State to State. 
 33. McCormack, supra note 15, at 698. 
 34. MCCORMACK & SIMPSON, supra note 32, at 45–46. 
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into formulating the tribunal at the Peace Conference, it never 
conducted any trials.35 This work, however paved the way for 
what has become the cornerstone of the international criminal 
trial, the International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) at Nurem-
burg.36 
Following the conclusion of World War II, leaders across the 
world demanded the Nazi perpetrators face justice for their 
crimes.37 The Allied nations could not afford to ignore these 
calls to hold responsible the perpetrators of some of the worst 
crimes humanity had ever seen.38 Initially, the Soviets suggest-
ed that de-Nazification could proceed quickly by implementing 
large-scale execution.39 Many Americans supported the calls for 
summary execution of the Nazi Generals.40 In spite of strong 
early support, however, the Allies rejected the proposal.41 In-
stead, Allied leaders decided to hold these individuals to ac-
count through a “fair process” that “furthered the ends of jus-
tice, retribution, and deterrence.”42 The Allies adopted the Lon-
don Charter of the IMT in August of 1945, which set forth the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal for several categories of crimes, a 
few of which many now consider the “core crimes” of interna-
tional law.43 While the establishing document delegated the 
                                                                                                             
 35. McCormack, supra note 15, at 702; see also, MCCORMACK & SIMPSON, 
supra note 32, at 47. 
 36. McCormack, supra note 15, at 714. 
 37. The United Nations War Crimes Commission was established in Octo-
ber 1942 to draw up lists of criminals to be tried. The commission was com-
posed of representatives from fifteen different nations, including the United 
States and Great Britain. EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE TRIAL OF THE GERMANS: AN 
ACCOUNT OF THE TWENTY-TWO DEFENDANTS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL AT NUREMBERG 5 (1966). 
 38. McCormack, supra note 15, at 714–15. 
 39. SMITH, supra note 20, at 85. 
 40. DONALD M. MCKALE, NAZIS AFTER HITLER: HOW PERPETRATORS OF THE 
HOLOCAUST CHEATED JUSTICE AND TRUTH 6 (2012). 
 41. SMITH, supra note 20, at 85. 
 42. Id. at 86. 
 43. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by Inter-
national Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INTL. LAW 551, 564 (2006); Charter of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal [London Charter] sec. 1, art. 1, sec. 2, art. 6. 
The London Charter gave the IMT jurisdiction over Crimes Against Humani-
ty, War Crimes, and Crimes Against Peace. Contrary to popular belief, it did 
not give the court jurisdiction over the Nazi genocide of the Jewish people. 
Genocide was not formally defined as a crime until the 1948 United Nations 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
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determination of specific procedures to the tribunal, the call for 
a “Fair Trial for Defendants” demonstrates that the authors 
contemplated just, fair, and unobjectionable process that would 
deter future leaders and provide retribution for those seriously 
aggrieved by the Nazi’s actions.44 This is not to suggest that the 
Tribunal is without criticism or problems. Scholars routinely 
point out the jurisdictional problems and the use of ex post fac-
to laws to criminalize the Nazi’s conduct.45 
The decision to prosecute the Nazi leaders at Nuremburg 
marked the beginning of the war crimes tribunal as an institu-
tionalized and expected response to atrocity. 46  Significant 
thought and care went into establishing the IMT to assure re-
spect for the substantive and procedural rights of the accused. 
While the IMT became the standard against which subsequent 
war crimes tribunals are frequently measured, it is not the only 
criminal trial to influence modern international criminal tri-
als.47 In fact, the form of the modern trials is more similar to 
the Eichmann trial.48 For example, the prosecution at the IMT 
relied heavily on the Nazi’s own documentation of their crimi-
nal conduct, using documentary video footage and extensive 
written materials.49  The victim-witness (or survivor-witness) 
was of significantly less focus than these other forms of evi-
dence.50 However, at the Eichmann trial, the prosecution chose 
                                                                                                             
Since then, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, and Genocide have come 
to be considered the core crimes of international law. JANN KLEFFNER, 
COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTIONS 1 (2008). 
 44. London Charter sec. 4, art. 16. 
 45. Jonathan Friedman, Law and Politics in the Subsequent Nuremberg 
Trials: 1946-1949, in ATROCITIES ON TRIAL: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
POLITICS OF PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES 75, 81 (Patricia Heberer & Jürgen 
Matthäus eds., 2008). 
 46. SMITH, supra note 20, at 23. 
 47. Id. at 22, 80. 
 48. Lawrence Douglas, The 50th Anniversary of the Eichmann Trial – A 
Look Back, YOUTUBE (June 13, 2011), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lYpvBG4ELSw. According to Lawrence 
Douglas’s address at New York University’s colloquium on the fiftieth anni-
versary of the Eichmann trial, the contemporary paradigm of international 
criminal law, what he calls the “jurisprudence of atrocity,” bears greater simi-
larity to the Eichmann trial than the Nuremberg trial. 
 49. Douglas, supra note 30, at 515. 
 50. Id. Justice Jackson of the IMT “tactically limited the use of ‘soft evi-
dence’—eyewitness testimony—in favor of ‘hard evidence’ – trial by docu-
664 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
to proceed in a different manner, and the victim-witness played 
a significant role in the trial.51 Subsequent trials have had var-
ying degrees of success in incorporating victims into the pro-
cess, with the ad hoc ICTY relying heavily on the victim-
witness.52 The ICC has also gone to great effort to assure the 
victim-witness a place in the trial.53 While several paradigms 
exist to provide justice in the wake of atrocity, including truth 
commissions like those used in South Africa and various South 
American countries,54 the trial paradigm is seen today as a 
fundamental requirement of doing justice in the wake of atroci-
ty.55 
III. THE MEDICAL MODEL OF BEHAVIOR AND DEVIANCE 
Nikolas Rose writes, “[w]e live inescapably in a biologized 
culture. Not merely the sickness of human beings, but also 
their personalities, passions and the forces that mobilize 
them—their identities themselves appear at least potentially to 
be explicable in biological terms, and increasingly in terms of 
their genetic makeup.”56 Rose’s assessment is quite apt. The 
process of medicalization allows one to probe conduct once 
thought to be a normal part of life for possible physiological or-
igins and place it in the realm of illness and disorder.57 Once 
thusly categorized, one can fix or improve that conduct, as is 
frequently done with pharmaceutical intervention.58 The psy-
                                                                                                             
ment. This approach assumed a broad and imaginative range of forms, in-
cluding an unprecedented use of documentary film in a juridical setting.” Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia Comes of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an 
International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y. 87, 107 (2001). 
 53. Article 68 of the Rome Statute of the ICC is dedicated to the “protec-
tion of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings.” 
This section carefully outlines the opportunities for participation of the vic-
tim-witness in the proceedings. Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court [Rome Statute], July 17, 1998, art. 68, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998). 
 54. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 55. Douglas, supra note 30, at 513. 
 56. Nikolas Rose, The Biology of Culpability: Pathological Identity and 
Crime Control in a Biological Culture, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 5, 6 
(2000). 
 57. Peter Conrad and Valerie Leiter, Medicalization, Markets and Con-
sumers, 45 J. HEALTH AND SOC. BEHAV. 158, 158–59 (2004). 
 58. Id. 
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chiatric community has been responsible for transforming a 
number of behaviors into medical conditions. One of the most 
prominent examples of the modern era is the medicalization of 
unhappiness. Incorporated in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM”) in 1980, major depressive 
disorder (depression), became an officially diagnosable condi-
tion, treatable with a class of prescription drugs known as Se-
lective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”).59 Americans 
and Europeans alike have embraced this phenomenon with 
great fervor, particularly with respect to depression. A recent 
report shows that doctors have prescribed antidepressants to 
one in ten Americans, with comparable figures in Europe.60 Pe-
ter Conrad and Joseph W. Schneider suggest that the public 
has become increasingly dissatisfied with the mild and benign 
symptoms of daily life. However, the fervor for “medicalizing” 
extends beyond every day illnesses and disorders, partly be-
cause moving behavior into the realm of the medical can depo-
liticize and remove moral judgment.61 
Biological and “pathological” explanations for criminal con-
duct appear as far back as the Fourth Century. In his Prior 
Analytics, Aristotle writes, 
It is possible to infer character from features, if it is granted 
that the body and the soul are changed together by the natu-
ral affections: I say ‘natural,’ for though perhaps by learning 
music a man has made some change in his soul, this is not 
one of those affections natural to us; rather I refer to passions 
and desires when I speak of natural emotions. If then this 
were granted and also that for each change there is a corre-
sponding sign, and we could state the affection and sign prop-
                                                                                                             
 59. Petra Zimmermann et al., Heterogeneity of DSM-IV Major Depressive 
Disorder as a Consequence of Subthreshold Bipolarity, 66 ARCH. GEN PSYCH. 
1341, 1341 (2009). 
 60. Courtney Hutchison, One in 10 Americans Use Antidepressants, Most 
Don’t See a Therapist, ABC NEWS, OCT. 19, 2011, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Wellness/10-americans-antidepressants-
therapist/story?id=14763251#.T5SLxFH54WE (last visited Jan 2, 2013); see 
also, University of Warwick, Ten Percent of Middle-Aged Europeans Are on 
Antidepressants, Study Suggests, SCI. DAILY (June 20, 2011), 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/06/110620094435.htm. 
 61. PETER CONRAD & JOSEPH W. SCHNEIDER, DEVIANCE AND 
MEDICALIZATION: FROM BADNESS TO SICKNESS 250 (1980). 
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er to each kind of animal, we shall be able to infer character 
from features.62 
Generally, Aristotle contended that individuals who had facial 
features resembling animals often had temperaments like 
those animals.63 As the emerging field of science shed light on 
new physical phenomena, biological theories of criminality 
evolved. 
The early “scientific” theories of deviance took a deterministic 
view of criminality, frequently asserting the deviant was born 
with the character trait.64 In the nineteenth century, phrenolo-
gy, the measurement and study of an individual’s skull to as-
sess personality, added systematicity to the notion of the in-
nate criminal.65 Much like physiognomy, the study of an indi-
vidual’s personality from his or her appearance, phrenology re-
lied on the assumption that outer appearances reflected inner 
states.66 Spurzheim, a noted phrenologist, wrote that “there 
must be an organ of the brain that determines the propensity 
to kill, and . . . function[s] independently of other propensi-
ties.”67 He noted protuberances in the skulls of several killers, 
which he attributed to an overdevelopment of particular re-
gions of the brain.68 Along with his colleague Gall, Spurzheim 
identified thirty-five characteristics of the head that corre-
sponded with particular personality types.69 Like most biologi-
cal explanations, phrenologists based their explanations on a 
deterministic approach to human behavior. Criminality was 
not the result of free will gone awry, but rather “abnormal 
brain organization.”70 Other nineteenth century theorists not 
engaged in phrenology also took a deterministic view of devi-
ance. Dr. George Savage wrote that “moral insanity” is innate, 
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inherited from “unsound parents” or a result of conception 
while the “parents were feverish or syphilitic.”71 
Cesare Lombroso, the father of modern criminology, wrote 
that the criminal is vain, bloodthirsty, remorseless, and unde-
terrable.72 In his work Criminal Man, Lombroso asserts a theo-
ry of atavism, the tendency to revert to earlier forms, suggest-
ing that criminals are biological “throwbacks,” who have re-
verted to an earlier, primitive, subhuman being, with multiple 
physical anomalies that separated them from the average per-
son.73 He writes, “[t]he most horrendous and inhuman crimes 
have a biological, atavistic origin in those animalistic instincts 
that . . . resurface instantly under given circumstances.”74 
The concept of heredity played a key role in early twentieth 
century biological theories. For example, Johannes Lange pub-
lished Crime as Destiny in 1929, which detailed the findings of 
his study of twins assessing the inheritance of crime.75 Lange 
studied thirty pairs of twins, at least one of whom was in pris-
on. The study contained thirteen pairs of identical twins and 
seventeen pairs of fraternal twins.76 Lange hypothesized that if 
identical twins were found in prison together more often than 
fraternal twins were, this finding would indicate the heritabil-
ity of criminality.77 Lange’s study confirmed his heredity hy-
pothesis. Of the thirteen identical twin sets, Lange found ten 
cases in which both were in prison together, whereas only two 
sets of the seventeen sets of fraternal twins were in prison to-
gether.78 Thus, Lange concluded, “as far as crime is concerned, 
monozygotic [identical] twins on the whole react in a definitely 
similar manner, dizygotic [fraternal] twins behave quite differ-
ent . . . innate tendencies play a preponderant part [in the 
causes of crime].”79 In the wake of the Nazi eugenics of the 
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1930s and 1940s, biological theories fell out of favor with crim-
inologists.80 
However, the latter part of the twentieth century saw a re-
surgence in biological theories of crime, beginning with Crime 
and Personality, in which Hans Eysenck “revived the medical 
model by explaining criminality in genetic and neurophysiolog-
ical terms.”81 In 1985, Wilson and Herrnstein published Crime 
and Human Nature, another major work in the revival of bio-
logical theories of crime. Wilson and Herrnstein argue that in-
dividuals differ at birth in the degree to which they are at risk 
for criminality.82 Working through the various biological theo-
ries offered throughout history, Wilson and Herrnstein con-
clude, “[t]he evidence leaves no doubt that constitutional traits 
correlate with criminal behavior.” 83  Although critics believe 
Wilson and Herrnstein engaged in “bad social science” and that 
their evidence leaves significant doubt, Human Nature began 
the resurgence of interest in biological theories of crime.84 
As scholars from various disciplines sought to understand the 
general heritability of deviant behavior, they also searched for 
the specific genetic sources of these behaviors.85 However, un-
like previous biological theorists, many of today’s behavioral 
scientists are not determinists. Studies on a variety of genes, 
particularly genes related to the formation and processing of 
neurotransmitters (chemicals in the brain that transmit sig-
nals from a neuron to a cell across a synapse), have yielded re-
sults that suggest a genetic component to deviant, particularly 
aggressive, behavior.86 For example, a particular recessive gen-
otype of the tryptophan hydroxylase-1 (“TPH1”) gene, involved 
in the synthesis of the neurotransmitter serotonin, has been 
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found to be a genetic risk factor for criminal behavior, particu-
larly homicidal behavior in patients with schizophrenia.87 The 
MAO-A gene, also known as the “warrior gene,” which codes an 
enzyme responsible for degrading the neurotransmitters nora-
drenaline, adrenaline, serotonin, and dopamine, has also been 
a significant target of research.88 Studies have revealed that a 
particular low activity form of the gene, in conjunction with en-
vironmental factors, could lead to aggressive impulsiveness.89 
While genetic research continues, particularly in an effort to 
understand gene-by-environment interactions, 90  advances in 
structural and functional imaging technology have led re-
searchers to focus on the brain as the source of understanding 
criminal behavior. 
“Neurocriminologists” are conducting research to understand 
deviant behavior in what many in the field claim is the final 
frontier—the origin of all behavior—the brain. 91  Like those 
studying gene-by-environment interactions, neurocriminolo-
gists recognize an interaction between an individual’s biology 
and his or her environment. Particularly popular, at present, is 
research on the neurological correlates of antisocial personality 
(psychopathy) and violent behavior, paying significant atten-
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tion, as Greely notes, to re-conceptualizing the criminal law’s 
understanding of the culpable criminal.92 
Imaging studies have paid attention to a variety of regions of 
the brain. Scholars have explored the role of the prefrontal cor-
tex—the region of the brain just behind the forehead that is 
implicated in decision-making and regulating behavior—in an-
tisocial and violent behavior since the early nineteenth centu-
ry. The case of Phineas Gage provided perhaps the first look 
into the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in antisocial be-
havior. Gage, a railroad worker, was injured when an iron 
spike went through his head, resulting in extensive damage to 
his prefrontal cortex. Following the incident, Gage, the normal-
ly courteous and hard-working individual, became antisocial.93 
Since the Gage case, empirical studies have shown that pa-
tients with antisocial personality disorder (“APD”) have an 11% 
reduction in prefrontal cortex gray matter, with similar find-
ings in studies of aggressive individuals and pathological li-
ars.94 Functional imaging studies have also revealed decreased 
activation in this region of the brain in impulsive violent indi-
viduals, suggesting impulsive violence stems from diminished 
use of the prefrontal cortex’s inhibition systems.95 In addition 
to the prefrontal cortex, a variety of areas of the limbic system 
show structural and functional differences in individuals with 
antisocial behavior.96 
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The amygdala has become perhaps the most prominent area 
of the limbic system investigated in research on individuals 
with theory of mind deficit (Autism Spectrum Disorders), ag-
gression, and the inability to interpret sadness and fear in fac-
es. The focus on this region is due in part because of its role in 
emotional processing.97 As Simon Baron-Cohen notes, each of 
these disorders can be characterized by a lack of empathy.98 
Particular focus has been paid to this region of the brain in 
psychopathic criminals in an effort to understand their poor 
fear conditioning and lack of empathy. According to functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (“fMRI”) studies, psychopathic of-
fenders have decreased activation in the amygdala in response 
to shocking and fearful stimuli.99 
Adrian Raine, a neuroscientist at the University of Pennsyl-
vania, has discovered the first neurodevelopmental marker for 
antisocial personality and psychopathy.100 In a study of eighty-
seven individuals, Raine and his colleagues examined the pres-
ence of Cavum Septum Pellucidum (“CSP”), a septum pellucid-
um with separation between its two component parts, to test a 
neurodevelopmental hypothesis of antisocial personality disor-
der and psychopathy.101 Their study found evidence that those 
with CSP had significantly “higher levels of antisocial personal-
ity, psychopathy, criminal charges and convictions” compared 
with control subjects, supporting the conclusion that there is a 
neurodevelopmental basis to a broad spectrum of antisocial be-
haviors.102 
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IV. NEUROSCIENCE IN COURTROOMS TODAY 
Neuroscientific evidence addressing a variety of legal issues 
has begun to appear in courtrooms across the globe. In most 
instances, the evidence has been offered to address individual 
or group culpability.103 In the United States, the most promi-
nent uses of neuroscientific evidence have been to establish 
diminished culpability. In three decisions since 2005, the Su-
preme Court addressed the use of neuroscientific evidence 
within the framework of punishment of adolescent criminals: 
Roper v. Simmons,104 Graham v. Florida,105 and Miller v. Ala-
bama.106 In Roper, several amicus briefs cited neuroscientific 
studies to argue that imposing the death penalty on adoles-
cents under age eighteen is cruel and unusual punishment.107 
The science was used to demonstrate that adolescents’ brains 
are not fully developed, particularly their frontal lobes, sup-
porting the assertion that adolescents’ self-control is dimin-
ished.108 The Court eventually found the death penalty uncon-
stitutional for minors, based on “objective indicia” that there 
was a national consensus opposing the imposition of the death 
penalty on individuals under eighteen.109 However, the Roper 
court did not clearly define the extent of its reliance on the 
neuroscientific evidence. Five years later, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of sentencing minors to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole for non-capital crimes in Gra-
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ham. As in Roper, medical and psychological groups submitted 
amicus briefs addressing issues related to the development of 
the adolescent brain.110 Justice Kennedy, writing for the major-
ity in Graham, clearly indicated the influence neuroscience had 
on the decision, as had not been the case in Roper.111 He wrote, 
No recent data provide reason to reconsider the Court’s ob-
servations in Roper about the nature of juveniles. As petition-
er’s amici point out, developments in psychology and brain 
science continue to show fundamental differences between ju-
venile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain in-
volved in behavior control continue to mature through late 
adolescence.112 
Most recently, in Miller, the Supreme Court ruled that man-
datory life without parole for juveniles convicted of homicide 
crimes violates the Eighth Amendment. 113  In this case, the 
Court recognizes that the science presented to the Court justi-
fying its decisions in Roper and Graham has become even 
stronger, requiring individually tailored sentencing that takes 
into account the particular characteristics of the youth offend-
er.114 During this same period of time, neuroscientific evidence 
and expert testimony based on fMRI scans have been offered 
during both the trial and the sentencing phases in two cases to 
mitigate culpability for specific adult offenders in murder cases 
in the United States. 
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In an Illinois criminal proceeding, Kent Kiehl, a professor of 
psychology at the University of New Mexico, scanned the brain 
of convicted murderer Brian Dugan.115 Dugan, who was already 
serving two life sentences, faced the death penalty for another 
murder. Kiehl scanned Dugan’s brain using a series of cogni-
tive control, attention, and moral-decision making tests, and 
conducted a psychological interview on Dugan.116 Dr. Kiehl de-
termined Dugan scored a 38 on the Hare Psychopathy Check-
list Revised (“PCL-R”), a diagnostic test developed by Robert 
Hare of the University of British Columbia.117 The PCL-R is a 
clinical assessment for psychopathy, and Dugan’s score of 38 
qualified him as a “psychopath.”118 According to the functional 
MRI scans, several areas of Dugan’s brain showed deficiencies 
common for psychopaths.119 Kiehl testified about his findings at 
Dugan’s trial. 120  Ultimately, the jury sentenced Dugan to 
death.121 With Governor George Ryan’s bill ending the use of 
the death penalty in Illinois, Dugan’s sentence has been com-
muted to life without parole. 
In Colorado, Adrian Raine testified similarly at Donta Page’s 
murder trial, citing deficiencies in particular regions of Page’s 
brain in support of a lesser sentence.122 Ultimately, a three-
judge panel, sentencing Page to life without parole, determined 
that the nature of Page’s crime did not rise to the level of war-
ranting the death penalty, particularly in light of his upbring-
ing.123 
Abroad, an Italian court admitted neuroscientific evidence to 
demonstrate the defendant’s inability to distinguish between 
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right and wrong.124 In that case, Stefania Albertani murdered 
her sister, burned the corpse, and attempted to kill her par-
ents.125  Albertani pled guilty to the charges in 2009. Using 
EEG and Voxel Based Morphometry (“VBM”), scientists found 
a lack of integrity and function in the anterior cingulate cortex, 
which controls aggressiveness and compulsivity.126 This finding 
coupled with the presence of the MAOA-uVNTR was said to 
explain, at least in part, Albertani’s propensity to act aggres-
sively and compulsively.127 The judge espoused the virtues of 
neuroscience to complement traditional psychiatric behavioral 
assessments to define precise pathologies and evaluate indi-
vidual abilities to distinguish between right and wrong.128 As a 
result of the neuroscientific evidence, Albertani’s sentence was 
reduced to twenty years.129 In addition to culpability, neurosci-
entific evidence has been offered for assessing truthfulness of a 
witness.130 With the permeation of neuroscientific evidence in 
courtrooms across the globe, the ICC is likely to face decisions 
regarding the admissibility and value of neuroscientific evi-
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dence in the future. How this information affects the admin-
istration of justice is a crucial issue. 
V. DOING JUSTICE IN THE FACE OF “THE SCIENCE OF EVIL” 
What my love and anger propels me to do is not what our 
government should do. Our government should help heal 
my pain, but also find ways to punish that do more than 
exact the most primitive kind of bloodlust and venge-
ance. The government should help heal our pain, but not 
offer the promise of a simple response to complex prob-
lems: the problems of violence that plague our society.  
         Austin Sarat 
The “core crimes” of international law “violate the most cen-
tral norms of humanity.”131 The global community has come to 
expect individuals be held to account for their crimes, to pro-
vide justice to the victims and to society. There have been sev-
eral approaches to seeking justice in the wake of atrocity. In a 
number of countries, South Africa being the most well-known, 
the post-conflict government has conducted truth commissions. 
Some of these commissions are vested with the power to grant 
amnesty for crimes committed on behalf of the state in ex-
change for a full accounting of those crimes.132 However, in the 
seven decades since Nuremberg, the perpetrator trial has be-
come the dominant response to atrocity, and many consider it a 
fundamental requirement and method of doing justice.133 
Eric Blumenson writes, “[t]o allow Pol Pot, Pinochet, and oth-
ers guilty of such crimes to go unpunished is a form of legal 
amnesia that appears to excuse the most egregious deeds, be-
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tray the victims who endured them, and encourage similar 
crimes against others.”134 The applicability of the traditional 
trial model is complicated by the nature of the crimes and will 
only be further complicated by the introduction of neuroscien-
tific evidence. This section will discuss the theories of justice 
underlying the perpetrator trial, some of the known problems 
with these theories, and present a discussion of the new chal-
lenges neuroscientific evidence will bring. 
At the most basic level, necessary for the fair administration 
of any criminal trial, are substantive and procedural rights. 
Early perpetrator trials were merely show trials, predeter-
mined to find the accused guilty. Charles I of England, in the 
first war crimes trial in a nominal court of law, was denied the 
right to counsel, to present a defense, to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him, or to appeal the court’s decision.135 The 
twentieth century war crimes trials represent a marked depar-
ture from this first venture. The framers of the London Charter 
worked hard to assure the rights of the accused at the IMT. 
While the charter left many of the specific technical rules of 
procedure up to the trial judges, the framers included a section 
titled “Fair Trial for Defendants,” which contemplated a just, 
fair, and unobjectionable process.136 The tradition has carried 
through the current war crimes trials. The convening statutes 
are carefully crafted, providing significant, detailed guidance 
on the substantive jurisdiction of the crimes prosecuted and the 
procedural rules governing the trials, including the rights of 
the accused. For example, Article 21 of the convening statute of 
the ICTY provides for detailed rights of the accused, while Ar-
ticle 25 provides for appellate process. Furthermore, unlike the 
IMT, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY provide 
detailed technical guidelines for the administration of the pro-
ceedings and admissibility of evidence. This is not to say all 
technical aspects of proceedings before the ICTY are unambig-
uous. 
Particularly relevant to this discussion is the ambiguity in 
the precise definition of diminished or lack of mental capacity 
before international criminal tribunals. This defense has only 
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been presented once before an international court, at the ICTY. 
In the “Celebici Camp” trial, defendant Esad Landzo raised a 
“special defense” of diminished or lack of mental responsibil-
ity.137 At the time, and still today, the definition of the legal 
standard for such a defense is ambiguous. During his trial, 
Landzo filed for a clarification of the precise legal parame-
ters.138 The court determined that the defendant bore the bur-
den of proving this defense, but reserved the definition for final 
judgment.139 Ultimately, the final judgment provided little clar-
ity on the matter, leaving open the issue of what constitutes a 
“lack of capacity.”140 This decision leads to the issue of neuro-
scientific defenses at the ICC. Article 31(1)(a) of the Rome 
Statute excludes individuals from the class of the criminally 
responsible if that person “suffers from a mental disease or de-
fect that destroys that person’s capacity to . . . control his or her 
conduct to conform to the requirements of the law.”141 
The “legally non-responsible/excludable” category is a socially 
constructed one, heavily influenced by the moral and value 
judgments of society that may vary from society to society. 
Law, and particularly legal categories such as this one, is care-
fully constructed based on our understanding of fairness and 
human behavior.142 For Greene and Cohen, neuroscience will 
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challenge the status quo of libertarianism143 that currently un-
derlies the law, shedding greater light on an individual’s ability 
to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of 
the law.144 As Joshua Greene writes, the “legitimacy of the law 
. . . depends on its adequately reflecting the moral intuitions 
and commitments of society.”145 Some neurocriminologists seek 
to shed greater light on individuals’ responsibility for actions, 
with the hope that their findings can better inform society’s in-
tuitions about human behavior. International criminal tribu-
nals, particularly the ICC, will likely be forced to determine 
whether to accept the logic of neuroscience to excuse or partial-
ly excuse defendants with neurologic impairments. As courts in 
the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany begin and 
continue to recognize a wider range of mental disorders as mit-
igating and legally excusing, can the ICC afford to refuse to 
acknowledge these conditions and the supporting evidence?146 
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In all legal systems, society is forced to draw lines that hold 
some individuals responsible, but not others. Even among those 
that can be held criminally responsible, there are further cate-
gorical divisions. For example, the United States Supreme 
Court has distinguished several classes of people for whom the 
available punishments are limited, i.e., prohibiting execution of 
minors and the mentally retarded, based on assumptions about 
the agency and capacity of the actor.147 Implicitly, these lines 
are drawn based on concepts of morality and justice, sometimes 
rooted in scientific knowledge about human behavior.148 Cer-
tainly, the bright line distinctions that society and the law cre-
ate do not perfectly fit the real world. Is a person with an IQ of 
71 so radically different than a person with an IQ of 69, such 
that the former is eligible to be executed while the latter is not? 
Is the brain of a nineteen-year-old so significantly different 
from a seventeen-year-old that the former should be eligible for 
execution, while the latter should not? 
The distinctions that law makes are also not universal. The 
minimum age at which an individual can be held criminally 
responsible varies by country and in some instances within a 
country. For example, in the United States, the youngest min-
imum age at which any state holds a child legally responsible is 
six, while the highest minimum age in any state is twelve. In 
the United Kingdom, whose legal system provides much of the 
foundation of the U.S. legal system, the minimum age is ten. 
Do the United Kingdom and other nations (or other states, in 
the case of the United States) that hold a child under twelve 
responsible commit a moral wrong by doing so? 
It is unrealistic to expect science to provide us with simple 
answers to these complex questions. Even when science can 
shed light on issues, how far will the law go in response to sci-
ence? History would suggest that even with scientific evidence, 
the law is only willing to go so far to recognize new infor-
mation. For example, neuroscience has provided U.S. courts 
with some information on juvenile brains and their responsibil-
ity for actions. However, the courts have not said that a juve-
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nile should be completely excused for his or her actions based 
on brain development. Instead, the courts have simply limited 
the permanence of the penal response to juvenile deviance.149 
Similarly, neuroscience may provide us with information from 
which to draw distinctions between who is and is not culpable, 
but the law may choose not to fully exculpate these individuals, 
but rather tailor the punishment as has been done with juve-
niles. 
Thus, a refusal to include particular conditions in the catego-
ry of legally exculpatory, even when inclusion is supported by 
neuroscientific evidence, is not necessarily an indictment of the 
system. Exclusion does not prove that the trials are unfair or 
are simply show trials. However, if the relevant disciplinary 
groups begin to treat the science as valid, a total denial of the 
defendant’s right to present a neuroscientific defense is likely 
to bring at least some scrutiny to the motivations for rejecting 
science. Some will likely see the decision as the result of a val-
ue-laden judgment that these individuals are inexcusable, re-
gardless of their ability to conform their actions to the law. So-
ciety is likely willing to accept this rejection. 
If the rights of the accused and the victim are balanced, very 
few are likely to complain that the scale has tipped in favor of 
the victim. However, if the courts deny defendants the right to 
present an exculpating defense, and perhaps the only viable 
defense available in some instances, because of a value judg-
ment, the courts would be undermining what the framers of 
international criminal tribunals have worked hard to do: estab-
lish legitimate trials for those accused of even the most heinous 
crimes.150 The rejection would also go against the establish-
ment of the insanity defense that is available in so many do-
mestic legal systems.151 For many of these defendants, as with 
many of the defendants who employ an insanity defense in do-
mestic criminal trials, the affirmative defense based on neuro-
science would be the only defense. A complete rejection, exclud-
ing neuroscience, may reveal that the purpose of these trials is 
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to find the defendant guilty of the act as a symbol of recogniz-
ing the wrong and standing with the victims, regardless of bio-
logical responsibility for the conduct. This choice does not nec-
essarily spell the end of the international criminal trial, or 
make these trials pure show trials. Perhaps, a rejection simply 
reinforces the notion that trying to fit ordinary legal procedures 
to extraordinary crimes is imperfect. It may suggest that what 
is just, even what procedures are just, is so contextual that the 
language of ordinary law is simply inapplicable to the interna-
tional criminal trial. 
On a deeper level, neuroscience presents significant challeng-
es for the current theories of justice and punishment that un-
derlie bringing perpetrators before a criminal tribunal. Ordi-
nary domestic criminal law subjects the guilty offender to penal 
sanctions justified by rehabilitation, retribution, and deter-
rence, both specific and general.152 While the rationality of or-
dinary law has been borrowed in support of the extraordinary 
perpetrator trial, reformation and rehabilitation play almost no 
part in the extant literature on supranational punishment.153 
Instead, international law theorists focus on deterrence and 
retribution.154 Deterrence is premised on the notion that the 
individual is a rational actor who will engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis, weighing the potential for success in his criminal act 
against the possibility of criminal prosecution and punitive 
sanction.155 As Jeremy Bentham wrote, “[p]unishment must be 
the object of dread more than the offense is an object of de-
sire.”156 However, the deterrent effect of international criminal 
prosecutions is perhaps more dubious than the deterrent effect 
of even the harshest domestic criminal sanctions. 
The IMT prosecuted the Nazis for their atrocities nearly sev-
enty years ago and concluded with several defendants receiving 
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the ultimate sanction—death.157 Yet, in the intervening seven 
decades, there have been heinous crimes committed by state 
actors around the world. Criminal prosecutions have followed 
the cessation of hostilities in many of these instances, yet there 
continue to be state-sanctioned atrocities. Perhaps the deter-
rent effect is diminished by the relatively light sentences meted 
out before some criminal tribunals.158 The mean sentence as of 
May 2006 at the ICTY was 14.3 years and the mean sentences 
of the Special Panels for East Timor was 9.9 years.159 Further 
diminishing the effect of these light sentences, each of these 
tribunals has granted several individuals early release.160 
Neuroscience further challenges the deterrent effect of inter-
national criminal prosecutions. If human behavior is in some 
way predetermined by brain biochemistry or structure, pre-
venting the deviant behavior from occurring through the pun-
ishment of others is unlikely to be successful. Admittedly, there 
are very few, if any, neuroscientists and neurocriminologists 
who adopt a purely deterministic approach to human behavior. 
However, even under theories of moderate determinism, the 
deterrent effect of punishment is likely to be significantly di-
minished. 
A fundamental requirement for deterrence to be successful is 
the assumption that the perpetrators are rational actors. How-
ever, when dealing with war criminals at the highest level of 
power, that assumption may become specious. Psychological 
assessments suggest that some of the infamously “evil” heads 
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of state possessed significant psychological disorders. 161  In 
2007, psychologists Frederick Coolidge and Daniel Segal asked 
five experts to evaluate Hitler according to the DSM-IV (the 
fourth edition of the DSM). The experts claimed that Hitler 
scored highly on the personality disorder scales for paranoia, 
antisocial behavior, narcissism, and sadism.162 The experts also 
believed that Hitler likely had schizophrenic tendencies.163 Coo-
lidge and Segal pursued their interest in exploring the psycho-
logical disorders of dictators, evaluating Saddam Hussein 
based on informant reports from eleven Iraqis who knew Hus-
sein either personally or through family connections for an av-
erage of twenty-four years.164 They claimed that Hussein, like 
Hitler, exhibited clear symptoms of paranoia, antisocial behav-
ior, narcissism, and sadism.165 Two years later, Coolidge and 
Segal endeavored to diagnose Kim Jong-il.166 According to their 
analysis, Coolidge and Segal claimed that Kim Jong-il exhibit-
ed the same “big six” constellation of personality disorders.167 
Coolidge and Segal believe that these six personality disorders 
may commonly reflect the personality of dictators generally.168 
Whatever deterrent role prosecution and punishment plays, 
“retribution is the dominant stated objective” of the perpetrator 
trial.169 In administering and justifying the level and means of 
any punishment in response to criminal wrongdoing, society is 
forced to walk the fine line between retribution and revenge. 
The existence of a meaningful distinction between the two con-
cepts in criminal law is heavily debated; however, retribution, 
unlike revenge, is grounded in the idea of “just deserts,” giving 
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people what they deserve for past actions.170 The difficulty for 
retribution in the prosecution of war crimes, however, is that 
the acts of those brought to trial are so heinous that no availa-
ble punishment can give these offenders what they deserve.171 
As Hannah Arendt wrote, “[f]or these crimes, no punishment is 
severe enough. It may well be essential to hang Göring, but it 
is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to all crim-
inal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.”172 
The limited severity of the sanctions available to the ICC and 
other international criminal tribunals further strains the abil-
ity to achieve retribution for war crimes. In contrast to the 
United States and the eighteen other nations currently employ-
ing capital punishment, the maximum sanction available to the 
ICC is life in prison.173 In addition to the inability to administer 
a punishment fitting the crime, retributivism suffers from be-
ing offender-centric.174 In administering punishment based on 
retributivist theory, justice to the victim is a “mere by-product 
of . . . the punishment that is required to treat the offender as 
she deserves.” 175  In fact, several studies have convincingly 
shown that survivors of atrocity have a strong preference for 
justice through truth telling.176 This seemingly undermines at 
least one of the justifications for the international criminal tri-
al, which is to bring about justice for the victims and their fam-
ilies.177 
Setting aside, for the moment, these widely contested issues 
of the success of retributivism in war crimes trials, neurosci-
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ence further complicates the ability to justify punishment 
through retribution. As Stephen Morse points out, the law cur-
rently requires only minimal rationality, for example, the abil-
ity to tell right from wrong, to be legally responsible and de-
serving of punishment.178 For Morse, neuroscientific discoveries 
thus far do not pose problems for the law’s ability to hold indi-
viduals responsible.179 Nor does Morse think it is likely we will 
discover anything soon that would materially challenge the 
law.180 However, as Joshua Greene writes, “our operative legal 
principles exist because they more or less adequately capture 
an intuitive sense of justice.”181 While Greene concedes that 
Morse is correct as the law stands, Greene and others believe 
that neuroscience will challenge and reshape our sense of jus-
tice, posing problems for retributivist justifications for punish-
ment in the future.182 In part, Greene contends that punish-
ment based in retributivism relies on a demanding concept of 
free will, rather than a minimal rationality.183 If behavior is 
determined based on brain biochemistry or structure, then ar-
guably we lack the requisite free will to meet the current 
standards of responsibility necessary for retributivism.184 Peter 
Conrad reaches the same conclusion, though he reaches that 
conclusion through a different path. He writes that if deviance 
is characterized as “badness,” deviants are considered respon-
sible for their behavior.185 Once deviance is placed in the realm 
of “sickness,” the deviant is no longer responsible for his or her 
actions and instead is deserving of treatment, rather than pun-
ishment.186 These notions create a number of problems. If the 
court rejects neuroscience, the defendant’s procedural rights 
may be abrogated.187 But, has the court also stepped from ret-
ribution into the realm of revenge? How can the court justify 
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punishing offenders in the face of neuroscientific evidence 
demonstrating diminished free will? 
The court may be able to legitimately move beyond the un-
willingness to completely excuse war criminals, but any legiti-
macy maintained in the guilt phase of the trial may, for the 
staunchest of retributivists, be erased by a vengeful punish-
ment.188 If the ICC ignores scientific information demonstrat-
ing a diminished ability to control one’s actions and continues 
to punish as it and other international tribunals have, it de-
parts from engaging in retributivism. Whether continuing 
these punishments in opposition to science enters the realm of 
revenge is, at least in part, dependent on the extent to which 
neuroscience actually reshapes our moral intuitions and the 
extent to which there is another reasonable, sustainable justifi-
cation for continuing the status quo punishment, such as ex-
pressivism or lustration.189 
Desert and moral judgment do not exist in a vacuum. As with 
the substantive construction of the legally excludable, the no-
tion of just deserts is socially constructed. When people draw 
moral distinctions between those deserving of blame and pun-
ishment and those who are excused, they do so not in abstrac-
tion but in context. State-sponsored atrocity is extraordinary. 
Finding a punishment that matches the horror done by geno-
cidal war criminals is impossible. Perhaps, because of the ex-
traordinary crimes under the jurisdiction of the ICC, society 
will continue to believe these individuals are deserving of pun-
ishment, regardless of biological culpability. Even if one were 
to concede that this no longer fits in the realm of retributivism 
because of a divide in the law and collective morality, there 
seem to be perfectly acceptable justifications for continuing to 
punish these offenders as the courts have, without entering the 
realm of revenge. 
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Greene may be correct that neuroscience will reshape our col-
lective moral intuitions, necessitating changes in law, but his 
hypothesis may also be incomplete. Based on the decades of 
scholarship on war crimes trials, it is clear that the overriding 
sentiment is that these individuals deserve to suffer the worst 
possible fates for their crimes, no matter what. It seems unlike-
ly to change society’s desire to continue to force these individu-
als to suffer the consequences of their actions, regardless of 
whether they could “conform their actions” to the law. As Pro-
fessor Lawrence Douglas writes, it may be possible to oppose 
the death penalty or other harsh punishment while endorsing 
its use for perpetrators of genocide, suggesting the moral dif-
ference between punishing ordinary criminals and extraordi-
nary criminals.190 Douglas contends that Arendt’s justification 
for Eichmann’s execution is the best orchestration of this point. 
In addressing the appropriateness of the death penalty for 
Eichmann, Arendt provides a reasoned justification for pun-
ishment: lustration. 191  She wrote in reference to Eichmann, 
“just as you supported and carried out a policy of not wanting 
to share the earth with the Jewish people and the people of a 
number of other nationals we find that no one, that is, no 
member of the human race, can be expected to want to share 
the earth with you.”192 Revenge, Nozick contends, is person-
al.193 In contrast, the agent of retribution need have no special 
tie to the wrong done.194 Thus, Arendt’s reasoned judgment 
skirts the realm of revenge, justifying Eichmann’s execution 
not in the name of the Jewish people or any other specific 
group, but in the name of humanity as a whole.195 Expressivism 
is a viable alternative to retributivism, particularly as it ties in 
with the inherently didactic nature of criminal trials.196 How-
ever, justifying harsh punishment based on expressivism may 
be more difficult than justification based on lustration. 
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Expressivism, an infrequently cited third alternative to re-
tributivist and deterrent notions of punishment, relies on the 
principle that the trials and the act of punishing serve as a 
symbolic, declarative act associated with the pedagogical pur-
pose of trials.197 The act of punishing communicates messages 
about power, authority, legitimacy, and normality.198 Most im-
portantly, punishment demonstrates society’s disapproval for 
the particular behavior and reinvigorates society’s faith in the 
law. 199  However, proponents of expressivism face significant 
challenges. First, if this is the appropriate justification for pun-
ishing war crimes, how can we reject neuroscientific evidence? 
Otherwise stated, how can we justify inflicting harsh levels of 
punishment, particularly in the face of neuroscientific evidence 
claiming to demonstrate diminished culpability, if the mere act 
of punishment is sufficient to communicate society’s disapprov-
al for conduct? Wringe responds to these potential objections in 
two ways. First, he states that the denunciation of the crime 
must be one that is “clearly sincere.”200 If the criminal is al-
lowed to escape with mere public denunciation or some other 
light punishment, the sincerity of the expression of disapproval 
might be questioned, especially if that denunciation was cou-
pled with a displacement of blame.201 Second, he notes that 
considerations of proportionality are central to the fairness of 
any system.202 War crimes are frequently considered the most 
serious crimes.203 Thus, a system of punishment that allowed 
war criminals to be tried but not punished would involve viola-
tions of proportionality, particularly given that it is unlikely 
that society would allow all disordered offenders an exemption 
from responsibility for their crimes.204 
The ICC will face difficult choices in an effort to “do justice” 
in the face of growing knowledge about the human brain. Re-
gardless of the court’s decision to accept or reject evidence that 
                                                                                                             
 197. Douglas, supra note 30, at 514; see also, DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 
17. 
 198. See DRUMBL, supra note 153, at 12. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Wringe, supra note 189, at 180. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 185. 
 203. WILLIAM SCHABAS, WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON THE 
DEATH PENALTY, JUSTICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 659 (2008). 
 204. Id. 
690 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 38:2 
behavior is in some part determined by brain structure and 
function, not all parties will be satisfied. Perhaps we have 
reached a point in time when the traditional criminal trial 
model is difficult to justify and maintain. As Justice Stone, in 
reference to Nuremberg, wrote, 
[i]t would not disturb me greatly . . . if that power were openly 
and frankly used to punish the German leaders for being a 
bad lot, but it disturbs me some to have it dressed up in the 
habiliments of the common law and the Constitutional safe-
guards to those charged with crime.205 
VII. MAKING HISTORY IN THE COURTROOM 
Anthony D’Amato has suggested that war crimes trials can 
be “one of the most fundamental lessons in civics that can be 
taught.” 206  Gideon Hausner, in his memoir, wrote that he 
“wanted the trial to capture the imagination of Israelis, among 
others, and give them a personal sense of what had hap-
pened.”207 Hausner is not alone in his quest for achieving a 
pedagogical purpose to conducting a war crimes trial. In fact, 
the great perpetrator trials of the last 100 years all aimed to do 
something more than render legal justice. Each of them explic-
itly embraced a didactic purpose.208 In perhaps their most im-
portant role, as history teller, these trials aim to provide jus-
tice, for not only the victims and the perpetrators, as expected 
in ordinary criminal trials, but also for history.209 Perpetrator 
trials provide an opportunity to narrate events publicly to dis-
seminate information about acts often cloaked in government 
secrecy.210 In openly addressing the atrocity, these trials have 
the power to “resuscitate[] history and [make] it into a current 
event,” creating a record that will withstand the test of time.211 
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These trials have attempted to accomplish their didactic goal 
in a variety of ways. The Nuremberg trials used extensive vid-
eo recordings and documents, created by the Nazis, to tell the 
story of the atrocities of the Holocaust.212 The Eichmann trial 
relied heavily on the victim-witness.213 Survivors told their sto-
ries in narrative form to form the evidence against Eichmann. 
Other trials have involved a mix of victim survivors and docu-
mentary evidence.214 The histories these trials tell, however, 
are not all encompassing. The historical narrative of these tri-
als is filtered through a legal lens confined by the rules of evi-
dence and procedure.215 Gerry Simpson notes, “problems occur 
when art, history and law begin to encroach on each other’s 
territory.”216 These problems are only heightened when science 
enters the mix. 
Since 1946, advances in technology have vastly transformed 
the speed at which information is disseminated. The rapid dif-
fusion of pictures, video, and written accounts has made global 
events less opaque. Individuals from Seattle to London to To-
kyo were able to follow the progress of the battle between the 
Libyan Rebels and Qaddafi’s forces live from the comfort of 
their living rooms. Major network news reporters Anderson 
Cooper and Christiane Amanpour have broadcast in real-time 
from some of the most war-torn regions, including Iraq, Soma-
lia and Rwanda. No longer will people in the first-world be 
completely in the dark about atrocities happening in far away 
parts of the globe. Yet, the didactic purpose of these trials is 
not diminished by the ease of information access. 
In an age in which a person could experience sensory over-
load from the images and sounds bombarding them from the 
nightly news, the didactic purpose is as important now as it 
was seventy-five years ago. In addition to the challenges with 
rendering justice, for both the accused and the victim, neuro-
science presents a significant challenge to the court’s ability to 
render justice for history. The admission of neuroscientific evi-
dence would significantly detract from the ability to tell a last-
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ing story about the events of the atrocity and the strength of 
the survivors and convey messages about responsibility and 
morality, instead focusing the trial on science. Peter Conrad 
writes that the dark side of medicalizing deviant behavior in-
cludes the dominance of experts, the dislocation of responsibil-
ity, and the exclusion of evil.217 These issues are particularly 
troubling for the perpetrator trial, given the importance of the 
didactic purpose. One of the fundamental questions that the 
court will need to answer in determining whether to allow neu-
roscientific defenses becomes, “What story do we want these 
trials to tell?” 
Lawrence Douglas points out that these trials cannot control 
the way in which they become cultural artifacts.218 While this is 
certainly true, the court does have control over the choices that 
cumulatively could affect a trial’s place in history. Allowing 
complex neuroscientific evidence may capture the narrative of 
the trial, shifting the focus from a story of responsibility and 
morality to a story about science. To mount a defense based on 
highly technical, scientific evidence, the defense needs to pre-
sent testimony or documents from at least one expert who has 
evaluated the defendant. The prosecution is sure to want its 
own expert to evaluate the defendant, who will likely come to a 
different conclusion regarding the defendant’s mental and neu-
rological status. As happens in many domestic trials relying on 
highly technical or scientific evidence, the trial becomes a “bat-
tle of experts.”219 Allowing this to happen is sure to shape the 
trials’ place in history. 
War crimes trials have already experienced problems related 
to the assertion of a psychological affirmative defense. In 1998, 
Esad Landzo raised a special defense in the Celebici Camp tri-
al.220 Five psychiatrists evaluated Landzo. The four psychia-
trists called by the defense, including two initially appointed by 
the court, concluded that Landzo suffered from psychiatric con-
                                                                                                             
 217. CONRAD & SCHNEIDER, supra note 61, at 259. 
 218. Douglas, supra note 30, at 521. 
 219. The Casey Anthony trial, which relied significantly on highly technical 
and scientific evidence, is a prime example of a trial that turned into a battle 
of experts. See, e.g., Mike Schneider, Casey Anthony Trial; ‘Battle of Experts,’ 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 23, 2011), 
http://www.wptv.com/dpp/news/state/casey-anthony-trial%3A-’battle-of-
experts’. 
 220. Sparr, supra note 137, at 59. 
2013] NEUROSCI. EVIDENCE IN INT'L CRIM. TRIALS 693 
ditions that impaired his ability to control his behavior. 221 
However, the experts came to different conclusions about what 
psychiatric condition Landzo suffered from.222 Dr. Landy Sparr 
testified for the prosecution and concluded that the personality 
abnormalities Landzo possessed were simply personality traits 
that had no pathological origin.223 Because of the lack of con-
sensus, the defense tried several strategies based on Landzo’s 
supposed diminished mental capacity.224 Early evaluations of 
the defendant suggested he suffered from Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”).225 Defense counsel initially proceed-
ed with their defense based on this theory. When it became 
clear the PTSD defense would prove unsuccessful, the defense 
shifted its strategy.226 Several subsequent psychiatric evalua-
tions of Landzo revealed a constellation of symptoms, including 
narcissism, antisocial behavior, “schizoid, compliant, border-
line, inadequate, immature, impulsive, unstable, and deprived” 
personality traits.227 The defense blamed his criminal conduct 
on this more generalized theory of “personality disorder.” Lan-
dzo was eventually convicted and sentenced to fifteen years in 
prison. In its judgment, the court acknowledged the psychia-
trists’ opinions and noted that it took into account Landzo’s age 
and mental condition in deciding his sentence.228 In presenting 
such a complex defense, the defense arguably distracted from 
the important narrative these trials can offer. Instead of a mo-
rality play, the Landzo trial is written about and remembered 
for its battle of psychiatric experts and “spaghetti thrown on 
the wall” style defense. Additionally, as Conrad notes, by defin-
ing a behavior in medical terms, the problem is removed from 
the public realm where discussion can occur among lay indi-
viduals and put on a plane where only medical individuals can 
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discuss it.229 How can lay individuals discuss the fairness of the 
outcome of the Landzo trial, or its legacy, without a medical 
professional’s understanding of his mental condition? 
While affixing responsibility is always a complex process, 
medicalization heightens the confusion and ambiguity.230  To 
begin with, determining and defining an individual’s responsi-
bility is more difficult in war crimes trials. Unlike an “ordi-
nary” crime, mass atrocity cannot occur without the coopera-
tion of numerous individuals. Preliminarily determining the 
nature of an individual’s role in the atrocity in an effort to as-
sess the appropriate criminal charges is certainly a difficulty 
that stems from the collective nature of atrocity. However, 
structuring a trial that situates the individual in the overall 
narrative of atrocity is an important task for the perpetrator 
trial. The difficulty for modern war crimes trials, unlike Nu-
remberg, is that we rarely see twenty-four defendants in the 
dock at once. Yet, these trials, even with only one defendant, 
strive to provide a narrative that is bigger than the individual 
perpetrator on trial. Pathologizing deviant behavior distracts 
from the ability to create a larger narrative. Medicalizing devi-
ance makes the criminal conduct the product of individual dis-
order or illness. Doing so ignores the important role of society 
and collective action in atrocity and focuses the narrative on 
the single individual without contextualizing his or her role in 
the atrocity. As one commentator writes, 
Hitler orchestrated the greatest mass genocide in modern his-
tory, yet some have reduced his motivation for the destruction 
of the Jews (and others) to a personal pathological condition. 
To them and to many of us, Hitler was sick. But this portrays 
the horror of the Holocaust as a product of individual pathol-
ogy.231 
Efforts to understand the motivations of these war criminals as 
the product of sickness “prevents us from seeing and confront-
ing man’s inhumanity to man.”232 The perpetrator trial teaches 
a lesson in responsibility and accountability, and reaffirms the 
rule of law. It has served as a warning that heads of state are 
not exempt from the rule of law. The trial process also creates a 
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clear narrative that distinguishes victim from perpetrator. 
Pathologizing deviance threatens to cloud this narrative by 
creating a multiplication of victims. 
Pathologizing deviance blurs the clearly defined “victim” and 
“perpetrator” and in doing so undermines the narrative of re-
sponsibility and morality, in some ways devaluing the victims’ 
experiences. Instead, understanding deviance as a product of 
biology or psychopathology creates multiple classes of victims. 
While we maintain a traditional class of victims that have been 
wronged in the course of atrocity, we create a new class: perpe-
trators that are victims of circumstance or biology. In multiply-
ing classes of victims, the trial would become handicapped in 
its narrative power. The trial would be unable to tell a story of 
responsibility, as blame simply shifts until no one can be held 
accountable. 
Finally, pathologizing criminal conduct leads to an exclusion 
of evil from discussions of atrocity. “Medicalization . . . shrouds 
conditions, events, and people and prevents them from being 
confronted as evil.” 233  According to Conrad and Schneider, 
there is little to be gained from thinking about people like 
Qaddafi as sick.234 A medical framework impedes our ability to 
comprehend “the human element in the decisions we make, the 
social structures we create, and the actions we take.”235 As we 
have seen from criticism of Arendt’s concept of “the banality of 
evil,” the characterization of Eichmann as seemingly normal 
was and is to this day discomforting to outsiders for more rea-
sons than just the arguable inaccuracy of the claim.236 Biologiz-
ing behavior produces much the same result as characterizing 
Eichmann as banal. Doing so eradicates the concept of evil, and 
eliminates the inherent sense of otherness of perpetrators of 
atrocity. While the “us” and “them” attitude is invariably one of 
the things that led to the Holocaust and other acts of atrocity, 
it is also what allows us to deal with the historical legacy of 
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these acts. If we view those that perpetrate acts of violence as 
significantly different from ourselves, then we can believe that 
we would never engage in the same conduct. However, if devi-
ant behavior is the result of biology or pathology, it may be the 
result of nothing more than a genetic roll of the dice. If so, 
there is a possibility that any one of us could have been afflict-
ed by the same “illness” and put in the same position as these 
individuals we would otherwise like to characterize as “mon-
sters.” 
CONCLUSION 
The twenty-first century has seen a resurgence in research 
on the biological theories of deviant behavior. Researchers are 
working to understand both the genetic and neurological fac-
tors contributing to criminal conduct. As the science continues 
to develop, the legal community has shown a growing interest 
in incorporating scientific evidence of biological correlates of 
criminality into criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court of 
the United States has referenced studies on the neurological 
development of adolescents in support of barring life without 
parole for non-homicide crimes. Several state trial courts have 
heard expert evidence describing individual defendant’s neuro-
logic deficits in the sentencing phase of capital cases. With 
these theories about deviant behavior comes a possible change 
in our conception of individual criminal culpability. 
Neuroscientific evidence poses significant challenges for tri-
als before the ICC. First, the court must manage a delicate bal-
ance between a defendant’s due process rights against the 
rights of the victim’s to see justice. Neuroscientific evidence, 
demonstrating diminished free will and culpability, complicates 
this balancing act. To reject the science and deny the defendant 
the right to present an exculpatory defense, the court would 
undermine what the framers of perpetrator trials have worked 
so hard to do since Nuremberg, essentially, to provide a fair 
forum for holding perpetrators accountable for their actions. 
Yet, if the court accepts the evidence and excuses the defendant 
based on his or her neurologic deficiencies, the court under-
mines the purpose of holding individual heads of state and 
high-level state officials accountable for their conduct. In the 
language we currently use to discuss these trials, since they 
are similar to their ordinary domestic counterparts, it is diffi-
cult to see how an outright denial of the right to present a neu-
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roscience-based defense does not make these trials show trials. 
However, even if Joshua Greene is right that the legitimacy of 
law will be undermined as societal morals change based on 
evolving understandings of free will and culpability, his hy-
pothesis may be incomplete. Contrary to the literature on these 
trials, war crimes trials may be so radically different from or-
dinary criminal trials that society may not change its perspec-
tive on the morality of holding war criminals accountable. 
Second, neuroscience presents challenges for our current the-
ories of justice and punishment that underlie bringing perpe-
trators before a criminal tribunal. Criminal law subjects guilty 
offenders to penal sanctions in order to achieve rehabilitation, 
retribution, and deterrence. Rehabilitation plays no role in the 
literature on war crimes trials. However, both retribution and 
deterrence hold significant places in the discussion of punish-
ing these offenders. If an individual lacks the ability to conform 
his or her behavior to the law because of specific pathology, the 
individual is unlikely to be able to engage in the calculus re-
quired for deterrence to be successful. The individual probably 
will not weigh the likelihood of prosecution and punishment 
against the perceived benefit from engaging in the conduct. 
Additionally, if the conduct were the product of sickness or pa-
thology, common sense would suggest the individual is not de-
serving of punishment, at least in ordinary circumstances. 
However, to let these individuals go without punishment seems 
reprehensible on its face. As commentators have noted, to let 
individuals like Pol Pot and Pinochet roam free is to be com-
plicit in their behavior. However, this does not mean we cannot 
continue to punish. Perhaps we simply need to reframe the dis-
cussions of punishment, justifying incarceration of war crimi-
nals on the symbolic value and the expressive function of pun-
ishment. 
Finally, the didactic purpose of these trials, which is key to 
their success, is threatened by allowing complex neuroscientific 
evidence. These trials must do justice not only to the perpetra-
tors and the victims, but also to history. These trials serve to 
create a body of evidence that serves as a record for future gen-
erations. They tell a story of how the victims were wronged and 
how society is willing to hold high-ranking individuals ac-
countable for their conduct. Allowing neuroscience-based de-
fenses would distract from a narrative of responsibility and a 
reaffirmation of the rule of law. Instead it will create a battle of 
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experts, the displacement of responsibility, and the exclusion of 
evil. 
Perhaps it is time to reassess the way we frame the purpose 
and justification of the great perpetrator trials. These trials can 
continue to serve society; however, it seems untenable to con-
tinue with the status quo in the face of evolving science. It is 
clear that regardless of how the court handles the situation, the 
admissibility of the evidence and the excusability of individuals 
with psychopathologies, the court faces significant challenges 
in the future. 
 
